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NOTES AND COMMENT
conditional sale contract is strengthened by considering the probable
effect of the words 'before such purchase (mortgage)' found towards
the end of the second sentence of Section 67 referring to the time
before which the conditional sale contract must be filed. If these
words mean 'before the mortgage is executed and delivered,' they
obviously cannot refer to a prior mortgage, for it would be impossible
for a subsequent conditional vendor to file his contract before the
antecedent mortgage was made.
6
Thus, in New York, a prior real property mortgage with a now
or hereafter acquired personal property clause does not incorporate
property sold by the conditional vendor notwithstanding his failure
to file.
Conclusion
No greater single stride in the right direction has been made
than that of the Court of Appeals in the Bonac case. By adopting
this common-sense approach to the problem, rather than stringently
adhering to the "rules" of fixtures or annexation, the court has given
effect to the obvious intent of the parties. It is submitted that the
continued use of such a criterion and the drafting of clearer record-
ing provisions, so as to give sufficient notice to subsequent interested
parties, will turn what was considered a nebulous and arbitrary seg-
ment of the law into a straightforward and understandable one.
M
UNAUTHOlUZED APPEARANcE
The State of New York is committed to an anomalous rule of
law by which the unauthorized acts of a responsible attorney at law
may bind an unserved resident by a judgment rendered by a court
of record. The rule is such that-in its extreme application-a sol-
vent attorney at law finding a summons on the street and entering
a general appearance for the defendant named therein could bind him
to a final judgment although the party had never seen the summons,
had never known of the action, and had never authorized the attorney
to act.
Denton v. Noyes,1 decided by the Court of Appeals in 1810,
established this rule in New York. In that case, the defendants were
A and B, acceptors, and C, drawer, of three several drafts. C, being
unable to comply with the terms demanded by the plaintiff's attorney,
offered other terms. The attorney agreed to discuss the counter offer
with the plaintiff only if some attorney of the court would stipulate
rs WHrrNEy, op. cit. supra note 52, at 81.
16 Johns. 296 (N. Y. 1810).
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for the defendants that the suits were to be deemed commenced as
of a prior date. This, of course, was to be used in the event the
settlement negotiations failed.
C then retained an attorney who gave the requested stipulation
in all the causes. This action was approved by defendant B but was
apparently unknown to defendant A. Subsequently the attorney con-
fessed judgment in all the suits for the amount of the drafts. De-
fendant A moved to set aside the judgment as to him on the grounds
that he had never authorized the attorney to represent him. By a
four to three decision, the court denied the motion to vacate the judg-
ment on the ground that an appearance by an attorney of the court,
though without warrant, is good as to the court. They held, however,
that the court would stay the proceedings and allow the party to
come in and defend the action on the merits if he so desired.
By so holding, the court completely ignored the first principles
of jurisdigtion and agency, for, as stated in Prashker's New York
Practice,2 in personam jurisdiction is obtained generally by personal
service of a summons 3 or by a voluntary appearance 4 filed by the
prospective defendant. There being, in fact, no service on this de-
fendant, jurisdiction over him would of necessity have to be founded
upon his voluntary appearance.
A did not file an appearance himself but an appearance in his
name was made. Therefore, it would seem necessary to establish
the authority of the attorney at law who purported to act in A's
behalf. The court admitted that the attorney received no authoriza-
tion from A and yet held A bound by the attorney's acts. Certainly
such a holding violates the general law of agency.5 Essential to that
relationship is the delegation of authority by the principal to the
agent. A principal is bound by the acts of his agent only when
(1) he has expressly given the authority, or (2) he has impliedly
conferred the authority by his acts or conduct, or (3) when, although
2 PRASHKERa, Naw Yoax PRAcrIcE § 76 (1947).
"Jurisdiction in personain may be acquired by (1) personal service of a
summons upon the defendant in the state; or, (2) by service of a summons
upon the designee of the defendant in the state; or, (3) by consent given in
advance of the acquisition of personal jurisdiction; or, (4) by voluntary sub-
mission of the defendant to the jurisdiction of the court, effected commonly
by the service of a general appearance; or, (5) by substituted service effected
upon a resident of the state."
s N. Y. Civ. PRAC. Acr § 218.
"A civil action is commenced by the service of a summons, which is a
mandate of the court. Rules may be made respecting requisites and form of
a summons and notice and indorsements thereon."
4 Id. § 237.
"The defendant's appearance must be made by serving upon the plaintiff's
attorney, within twenty days after service of the summons exclusive of the
day of service, a notice of appearance, a copy of an answer or a notice of
motion raising objection to the complaint in point of law. A voluntary gen-
eral appearance of the defendant is equivalent to personal service of the sum-
mons upon him."
5 MECH'Em, AGENCY § 210 (2d ed. 1914).
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not intending to confer the authority, the principal's acts have, none-
theless, so clothed the agent with apparent authority that a third
person was justified in relying upon it. In any case, it must be an
act of the principal which is relied upon. No act of the agent or of
a stranger can ever give the authority necessary to bind the principal.
The court sought to justify its total disregard of the elementary
principles of jurisdiction and agency by basing its holding on English
case law. Referring to the English decisions, the court observed,
"Though the cases may not seem correct, if we were to reason from
the first principles, yet if the rule appears to be settled, we are not
at liberty to reason in that way . .." 6 and ". . . it can be shown
that the court is bound by a series of decisions, to preserve the
judgment." 7
An analysis and evaluation of the cases relied upon by the court
is thus indicated to ascertain if it was in fact so bound.
The earliest case cited is Alleley v. Colley 8 which was decided
in 1624. There the court would not relieve a party on a writ of
audit querela 9 when an attorney put in an unauthorized appearance
for him. This holding might well be explained on the ground that
the petitioner sought relief by the wrong writ. It does not neces-
sarily appear to be authority for holding that no relief against the
judgment will lie.
The next case in point of time relied upon by the court and one
which purportedly bound the court to deny the motion to vacate the
judgment is an Anonymous case decided in 1662.10 In its entirety
it states:
If an attorney without warrant appear, this is a good appearance as to the
court, and the attorney only lyable to an action: an so if such an attorney
mend an immaterial point contrary to the rule of Court, that is remediless,
though a contempt punishable by the Court.
But Chivers v. Fenn 1 which was reported a few years later
and which states an exactly opposite holding was dismissed in Denton
'v. Noyes as "... a brief and loose report." 12 For comparison it too
is quoted in full:
6 6 Johns. 296, 304 (N. Y. 1810).
7
Id. at 301.
8 Cro. Jac. 695, 79 Eng. Rep. 603 (C. B. 1624).9 1 BACON, A Nzw ABRmXMENT OF 'mn LAW 307 (5th ed. Gwillim, 1798).
"An audita querela is a writ to be delivered against an unjust judgment or
execution, by setting them aside for some injustice of the party that obtained
thenm, which could not be pleaded in bar to the action; for if it could be
pleaded it was the party's own fault, and therefore he shall be relieved, that
proceedings may not be endless. '
10 1 Keb. 89, 83 Eng. Rep. 828 (K. B. 1662).
212 Show. 161, 89 Eng. Rep. 861 (K. B. 1682).
126 Johns. 296, 304 (N. Y. 1810). The court on page 305 also mentions
that the holding vas questioned in BACON, op. cit. supra note 9, at 297. Therein
is found a statement of the facts of the case and then "Qu. If the courts
would now set aside the judgment against the bail, if they were regularly
1951)
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Debt on a bail-bond. The principal gives a warrant of attorney to appear
for himself to Mr. Twyford, and his bail being his neighbours, he orders him
to appear for them too, which Twyford does; and, for want of a plea, judg-
ment is had against all three.
But upon motion judgment was set aside as to the bail, the principal's order
not being a warrant to appear for more than himself; but it being by ignorance
of the law, and not a wilful act, the Judges on motion discharged the attorney
as to any contempt.13
It would seem to an objective observer that the Chivers case
cannot be considered a "loose report" when it is compared with the
report of the Anonymous case. For, in addition to stating the hold-
ing with equal clarity, it gives the factual situation upon which the
holding is based. Furthermore, it reaches a conclusion consistent
with the rules of agency and jurisdiction.
The next cases, chronologically, are two Anonymous reports '
4
found in 1 Salkeld, both of which record merely the holdings. The
first, succinctly states 15 that an unauthorized appearance by an at-
torney binds the party purportedly represented. The second case,
as briefly stated,18 holds that the judgment is valid unless the attorney
appearing without authority be insolvent, in which case the judgment
will be vacated.
Since the validity of any judgment should depend upon the jur-
isdiction over the defendant, the courts, in both cases, must have con-
cluded that said jurisdiction had been conferred upon them by the
appearances of the attorneys. Conceding that to be the fact, what
then was the basis upon which the court in the second case vacated
the judgment? It either had jurisdiction or did not have jurisdiction.
If it had jurisdiction, the, attorney's insolvency certainly should not
have operated to divest the court of the jurisdiction which it had, or
felt it had obtained in the first instance. In an attempt to add stature
to these holdings the court in Denton v. Noyes noted that they are
served with process, unless they had a good defence?" Since in the Chivers
case as in the Denton case the defendant was not served, such a statement
should not be construed as a criticism.
Is 2 Show. 161, 89 Eng. Rep. 861 (K. B. 1682).
14 1 Salk. 86, 91 Eng. Rep. 81 (K. B. 1699); 1 Salk. 88, 91 Eng. Rep. 82
(K. B. 1704).
1• 1 Salk. 86, 91 Eng. Rep. 81 (K. B. 1699). Chief Justice Holt said,
"The course of this Court is, where an attorney takes upon him to appear,
the Court looks no farther, but proceeds as if the attorney had sufficient au-
thority, and leaves the party to his action against him."
16 1 Salk. 88, 91 Eng. Rep. 82, 83 (K. B. 1704). "An attorney appeared,
and judgment was entered against his client, and he had no warrant of attor-
ney; and now the question was, if the Court could set aside the judgment?
Et per Cur. If the attorney be able and responsible, we will not set aside thejudgment. The reason is, because the judgment is regular, and the plaintiff
ought not to suffer, for there is no fault in him; but if the attorney be not
responsible or suspicious, we will set aside the judgment; for otherwise the
defendant has no remedy, and any one may be undone by that means."
[ VOL. 25
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cited by Lord Chief Baron Comyns as good law.'7 However, an
inspection of Comyns discloses that also cited in the same section is
a statement inconsistent with the holding of the Salkeld cases and
consistent with the Chivers case.' s
Three later cases were cited by the New York court as reaffirm-
ing its doctrine. Although these cases may be cited validly as so
holding they can also be explained on other grounds.19
The latest English case dealing with unauthorized appearance
which is mentioned in the Denton opinion is that of Robson v. Eaton.20
There an attorney innocently acting under a forged warrant had a
judgment entered in the plaintiff's name. On payment, made in ac-
cordance with an order of the court in that action, the attorney turned
the money over to the person who had forged the warrant believing
him to be the proper person. When the true plaintiff sued on the
debt the defendant pleaded in bar the prior judgment and payment.
The plea was rejected, the court holding the prior payment insuffi-
cient as a discharge. The eminent jurist, Lord Mansfield, stated:
"There can be no doubt upon this case. The attorney, who trusted
to the warrant of attorney, is liable, and Davis who committed the
forgery is liable to him. The record of the Common Pleas amounts
to no more than this, that the attorney prosecuted the suit in the
plaintiff's name; but it does not state the authority given to him by
the plaintiff for so doing." 2'
It would seem that this holding, should serve unequivocally to
overrule the previous English cases since the court reached the con-
clusion that, the acts of the attorney in the first suit being unauthor-
ized, the judgment was a nullity. Judge Kent in the Denton case
seems to decide arbitrarily that this case was not intended to over-
throw the former decisions on this subject and states that it
" .. cannot be received here as sufficient authority for that pur-
pose." 2 He gives no reason for being so persuaded. If Judge Kent
based his distinction upon the difference in status between the un-
1'7 CmYNS, A DIGEST oF =un LAWS OF ENGLAND § B7.
"And if the attorney appears, the court does not inquire, whether he had
a good authority. 1 Sal. 86(c)
And, if he be sufficient, does not set aside the judgment, though entered
without warrant. 1 Sal 88(d)."
18 Ibid. "So a warrant of attorney for the principal is not sufficient for the
bail, in a scire facias against him; for they are distinct suits. R. [Sic] Sal.
603."
19 Rex v. Addington, Sayer 259, 96 Eng. Rep. 873 (Y. B. 1755) (on the
question of the binding force of an idtra vires act of an attorney by which
he exceeded his given authority); Bumfeild and James, 2 Barn. 232, 94 Eng.
Rep. 469 (K B. 1732) (on the duty imposed by the court on an attorney to
complete an appearance once undertaken); Lorymer v. Hollister, 1 Str. 693,
93 Eng. Rep. 788 (K. B. 1726) (on the conclusive presumption of service by
the bailiff).
201 T. R. 62, 99 Eng. Rep. 973 (K. B. 1785).
21 Ibid.
22 Denton v. Noyes, 6 Johns. 296, 305 (N. Y. 1810).
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authorizedly represented parties, namely, the defendants in the
Salkeld cases, and a plaintiff in the Robson case, it is submitted that
the distinction is unfounded. Whether plaintiff or defendant, one
who is made a party to an action without his authority or consent
ought not to be bound by the judgment rendered. The plaintiff in
the Robson case, as the defendant in the other cases, was represented
without his authorization, and if the judgment be not binding on a
plaintiff in such circumstances it logically follows it should not be
binding on a defendant.
After analyzing the cases cited in the Denton decision, especially
the Robson case, it is difficult to explain or to justify Judge Kent's
flat statement that the "rule appears to be settled," 23 as to the validity
of judgments obtained by means of an unauthorized appearance.
The New York courts, nevertheless, have uniformly followed
the rule as enunciated in Denton v. Noyes. The subsequent cases
can be separated into two groups. In the first group are those that
adhere to the doctrine because of stare decisis,24 and often with re-
luctance. The cases in the second group generally adopt as their own
the arguments advanced 2 5 in the Denton case as to the unquestion-
able dignity of an attorney at law, the necessity for the certainty of
judgments, the duty of the court to protect a plaintiff who has inno-
cently relied on the unauthorized appearance, and finally, the infre-
quency with which the problem arises and the consequent absence of
harm or inconvenience from so holding.
None of these arguments goes to the essence of the problem
which, to reiterate, is jurisdiction. Moreover, even if these arguments
were pertinent, they would still be open to attack.
Certainly, the importance of preserving the dignity of the attor-
ney cannot be said to outweigh the importance of preserving the sub-
stantive rights of our citizens. Since the court would seem to feel
that the appearance filed by an attorney creates a conclusive presump-
tion of his authority, it should be noted that, by statute, if the same
attorney were to appear in an action involving real property on behalf
of a non-resident defendant, he is required to file proof of his au-
thority.2 6 Where then, is the presumption in such a case? Ulti-
mately, the argument can amount to nothing more than a rationaliza-
23 Id. at 305.
24Bates v. Voorhees, 20 N. Y. 525 (1859) (construed the right to come
in and defend as also giving the right to appeal) ; Ackar v. Ledyard, 8 N. Y.
62 (1853); Ingalls v. Sprague, 10 Wend. 672 (N. Y. 1833); Meachamn v.
Dudley, 6 Wend. 514 (N. Y. 1831) (the judgment was vacated because of
the insolvency of an Oswego attorney).25 Mayor of City of New York v. Smith, 29 Jones & S. 374 (N. Y. 1892);
Ferguson v. Crawford, 70 N. Y. 253 (1877); Sperry v. Reynolds, 65 N. Y.
179 (1875); Brown v. Nichols, 42 N. Y. 26 (1870) (decided "upon reasons
of policy and justice which are discussed in the case of Denton v. Noyes ..
Hamilton v. Wright, 37 N. Y. 502 (1868).
26N. Y. Crw. PRAc. R. 55.
.330 [ VOL. 25
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tion by the court of an attempt to preserve its own dignity by,
preserving the dignity of its officer, the attorney.
Manifestly, the attempt defeats itself, for there is no greater
method of impairing the dignity of the court than by subordinating
the traditional rights of litigants to a shallow glorification of
attorneys.
Furthermore, to predicate the Denton rule on the necessity for
the certainty of judgments, again seems to impinge upon the dignity
of the court and indeed upon our entire system of jurisprudence. It
cannot be said that what is desired is certainty of judgments, right
or wrong, valid or invalid. Rather, what is sought is certainty of
valid judgments. This is evident by the promptness with which the
courts ordinarily vacate judgments when it is shown that there was
a technical defect in the service-of the summons. Judgments have
been vacated for improper service of summons where, at defendant's
direction, the process server handed the summons to defendant's hus-
band in her presence; 27 where an infant was served, but no service
was made upon his parent or guardian 2 8 as required by statute;2 9
and where, by the method of service employed by plaintiff, the de-
fendant was precluded from making a timely appearance.8 0
The infrequency with which the problem may arise neither miti-
gates the basic error of the rule nor affords much comfort to the
luckless party to whom the injustice does occur.
Since, in any case, the court has a duty to protect the rights of
all parties concerned, the court's solicitude for the plaintiff at the
expense of the defendant seems unwarranted. Of the two, only the
plaintiff has the knowledge and opportunity to ascertain whether an
effective service or a valid appearance was made.
True, the court in Denton v. Noyes attempted to mitigate the
severity of the holding by allowing the defendant to come in and
defend. However, this is of no real benefit unless he has a meri-
torious defense, whereas defense or not, he should be entitled to the
protection of our laws which require the regular commencement of
an action. Also he is entitled to whatever protection he may receive
from the statute of limitations. Even assuming that he has a de-
fense he should not be called upon to plead it unless there is a proper
exercise of jurisdiction.
Oddly enough, notwithstanding the less favorable treatment
which non-residents customarily receive in most matters, a better rule
has been reached in their case with respect to unauthorized appear-
ance. The New York rule as to non-residents unauthorizedly repre-
27 Ives v. Darling, 210 App. Div. 521, 206 N. Y. Supp. 493 (3d Dep't
1924).
28 Jacobson v. Krekell, 223 App. Div. 440, 228 N. Y. Supp. 371 (1st Dep't
1928).
29 N Y. Civ. PRAC. Acr § 225.30 Bulkley v. Bulkley, 6 Abb. Pr. 307 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1858).
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sented was laid down in the case of Vilas v. Plattsburgh.81  The
court, in that case, modified the Denton rule and allowed the non-
resident defendant to vacate the judgment. It implied further that
relief was available in a collateral as well as in a direct action. Judge
Andrews made the distinction that in Denton v. Noyes, the judgment
had been against a citizen of the state within its jurisdiction while
in the Vilas case the defendant was at all times a non-resident and
without the court's jurisdiction.
While it is true that residence is one of the bases of jurisdic-
tion,82 it is also true that a court cannot properly exercise this gen-
eral jurisdiction until notice and opportunity to be heard have been
given to the defendant " and, therefore, there is no real ground for
the distinction drawn between residents and non-residents. In either
case, the jurisdiction necessary for a court to render a valid judg-
ment had not been obtained.
The mere fact that a non-resident is in a much more advan-
tageous position than a resident seems to establish the incongruity
of the entire situation and since the result of the Vi/as case is the
desirable one, the root of the trouble is with the reasoning in the
Denton opinion.
A correct application of the legal principles involved would have
resulted in the judgments in Denton v. Noyes being vacated. This
reasoning has been adopted by the English courts in a similar case.3 4
The Court of Exchequer in 1847 (subsequent to the Denton case)
vacated a judgment so obtained because the defendant had not been
served. When so holding, the Court of Exchequer certainly had
available for its consideration the English authorities cited in the
New York case. Since the English courts have led the way in de-
81123 N. Y. 440, 25 N. E. 941 (1890).32
RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 77 (1934).
"(1) The exercise of jurisdiction by a state through its courts over an
individual may be based upon any of the following circumstances:
(a) the individual is personally present within the state,
(b) he has his domicile within the state,
(c) he is a citizen or subject owing allegiance to the nation,
(d) he has consented to the exercise of jurisdiction,
(e) he has by acts done by him within the state subjected himself to itsjurisdiction.
(2) In the absence of all these bases of jurisdiction, a state through its
courts cannot exercise jurisdiction over individuals."
81 Id. § 75. "A state cannot exercise through its courts jurisdiction over a
person, although he is subject to the jurisdiction of the state, unless a method
of notification is employed which is reasonably calculated to give him knowl-
edge of the attempted exercise of jurisdiction and an opportunity to be heard."34 Bayley v. Buckland, 1 Exch. 1, 154 Eng. Rep. 1 (Ex. 1847).
[ VOL.. 25
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fining the correct doctrine,3s no reason can be perceived why New
York should not now follow suit.
The lack of jurisdiction according to accepted principles is so
obvious that the sole remaining arguments seem to be those generally
classified under the caption "public policy." If public policy is the
only basis for validating a judgment based upon an unauthorized
appearance then it is submitted that the New York courts have for-
saken their duty to decide cases in accordance with sound legal prin-
ciples and have usurped the function of the legislature, to which should
be left the task of enacting legislation in the interest of public policy.
6
Such judgments should be vacated, and the plaintiff, not the defen-
dant, should be made to look for relief to the attorney whose acts
caused the judgment to be entered.
35 In re Browne's Estate, 19 Ir. L. R. 183, 187 (1887). "Thus reason, prin-
ciple, and the most recent authority, all seem to me to be opposed to the doc-
trine that a man might be involved in heavy costs by a solicitor instituting
proceedings in his name, of whose existence he had been previously unaware.
36 Thus when the need for a conclusive presumption of consideration for
a negotiable instrument was seen, the result was achieved by legislation. See
N. Y. NEG. INsmr. LAW § 54.
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